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THE UTILITY OF NON-USE VALUES IN
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENTS
JASON J. CZARNEZKI*
ADRIANNE K. ZAHNER**
Abstract: Non-use values are frequently underestimated or ignored in
natural resource damage assessments, despite the fact that there are
significant social and economic benefits to assessing costs for lost non-use
values. The regulations of the Department of the Interior, which bind
some CERCLA trustees, create unusual barriers to the consideration of
non-use values and are potentially vulnerable to a reasonableness chal-
lenge under Chevron v. NRDC. Trustees who are not bound by the DOI
regulations should consider calculating and assessing non-use values be-
cause of the economic and social benefits of recognizing non-economic
injury caused by the destruction or degradation of natural resources.
INTRODUCTION
Maine's Penobscot River runs 240 miles from Penobscot Lake on
the Canadian border to Bucksport on the state's Atlantic coast. The
river forms the artery of an 8570-square-mile drainage basin, making
it the second-largest river system in New England.' The Penobscot
River Valley has been the home and cultural center of the Penobscot
Indian Nation for thousands of years,2 and the river has played an in-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. A.B., J.D., University of
Chicago.
**Judicial Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Maine. B.A., Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Amherst;J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law.
The authors wish to thank Michael O'Hear, Katy Rand, Cass Sunstein and Andrea
Voyer for their most helpful comments.
I Maine Rivers, Penobscot Watershed, at http://www.mainerivers.org/penobscot.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2005); Penobscot Partners, Watershed Background & History of the River,
at http://www.penobscotriver.org/river.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
Paul Bisulca, Penobscot: A People and Their River, CONSERVATION MATTERS, Summer 1996,
available at http://www.penobscotnation.org/articles/bisulca.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005);
Office of the Governor & Council, Penobscot Indian Nation, Statement of Barry Dana, Chief
of the Penobscot Nation (Oct. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Statement of Barry Dana], at http://
www.penobscotriver.org/press._packet/Penobscot%20Nation%20statement.pdf (last visited
Mar. 28, 2005).
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tegral part in the development of Maine's economy-from fishing,
timber, and hydroelectric power industries to river rafting.3 In part
because of its role in economic development, however, the Penobscot
River today suffers from serious pollution problems.4
Beginning in 1967, a chemical plant in Orrington, Maine, con-
tinuously discharged wastewater containing significant amounts of
mercury into the Penobscot River and emitted still larger quantities of
mercury through airborne emissions.5 As a result of this and other
sources, mercury contamination levels in the lower Penobscot River
far exceed "safe" levels, and are among the highest in Maine (which
itself has high rates of mercury contamination compared with other
states in the nation).6 Because of the unique way mercury interacts
with its environment, it multiplies in toxicity as it moves up the food
chain, and it remains in the environment for decades after the release
of pollutants has ceased.7 The Penobscot River also suffers from con-
taminants other than mercury, such as dioxins8 and tar deposits.9
Citizens' use of the river is severely limited by the contamina-
tion.10 The State of Maine Bureau of Health has issued a standing fish
consumption advisory cautioning citizens to limit their consumption
of fish from the lower half of the Penobscot River to one to two meals
per month." Women who are nursing, pregnant, or who may become
3 See Bisulca, supra note 2; Maine Rivers, supra note 1.
4 See generally Bisulca, supra note 2 (discussing the nature of the pollution problems aris-
ing from the development of hydroelectric power plants and paper manufacturing mills).
5 Me. People's Alliance v. HoltraChem Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 2d 237, 242 (D. Me.
2002).
6 Id. at 248.
7 Id. at 244-45, 251.
8 See Bisulca, supra note 2 (asserting that "dioxin is the most potent carcinogen known
to man"); Interagency Working Group on Dioxin, Questions and Answers About Dioxins
(2004) (finding that chlorine bleaching of pulp and paper can create dioxins), at http://
www.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/dioxinqa.html#gl (last updated Oct. 29, 2004); Natural Res.
Council of Me., Maine's Dioxin Problem: The Paper Mill Connection (noting the health hazards
of dioxins, especially those found in the Penobscot River), at http://www.maineenviron-
ment.org/cfree/dioxinupdate.htm (last updated Feb. 25, 2005).
9 See generally City of Bangor v. Citizens Communication Co., No. Civ. 02-183-B-S, 2004
WL 483201 (D. Me. Mar. 11, 2004) (litigating the cleanup costs associated with a tar slide
in the Penobscot River).
10 See Me. People's Alliance, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
1 Me. Bureau of Health, Warning About Eating Freshwater Fish (Aug. 29, 2000), available
at http://mainegov-iniages.informe.org/dhhs/ehu/fish/2KFCA.pdf. Inorganic mercury
becomes methylmercury after interacting with microorganisms in the river's sediments. See
Me. People's Alliance, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 244. Methylmercury affects the development of the
central nervous system, but also causes damage to fully-developed organisms, including
humans, such as cardiovascular problems resulting in heart disease and stroke. Id. at 245.
[Vol. 32:509
Non-Use Values in Natural Resource Damage Assessments
pregnant, and children under the age of eight are warned not to eat
any inland freshwater fish because of mercury's effect on the develop-
ing brain.12 Some individuals refrain from swimming or boating in the
river because of concerns about the health effects of exposure to
these pollutants. 13
The contamination causes other losses, too. One citizen has
testified that she felt "robbed" of her right to use the Penobscot River
and Bay as a result of the mercury contamination. 14 The inability to
fully exercise its fishing rights in the Penobscot River affects the eco-
nomic well-being of the Penobscot Indian Nation, but it also stresses
the Nation's culture and community, centered as they are on the river
itself. 15 Wildlife enthusiasts are harmed as a result of pollution's de-
structive effects on the reproductive and survival capacities of the
river's flora and fauna. 16 These very real but non-economic losses can
be referred to as non-use values.
The term "non-use value" describes the values attributable to the
simple knowledge that something exists ("existence value"), the po-
tential for its use ("option value"), or the expectation that it will be of
value to future generations ("bequest value"). 17 Losses may be in-
curred in one or more of these categories of non-use values when a
natural resource is damaged by pollution. 18 In the case of a polluted
river, preservationists may have lost peace of mind that the natural
environment was being protected; the loss of a community resource
or source of pride may have had a detrimental effect on the cohesion
of the community; and future generations may be prevented from in-
heriting the river's environmental assets. 19 Both use and non-use val-
12 SeeENvTL. HEALTH UNIT., supra note 11.
13 Me. People's Alliance, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
14 Id.
15 See Bisulca, supra note 2; Statement of Barry Dana, supra note 2 ("We are inextrica-
bly tied to the Penobscot River through a cultural, physical and spiritual relationship that
runs in our veins as the original inhabitants of this region.").
16 See Me. People's Alliance v. HoltraChem Mfg. Co., No. 00-CV-69, 2001 WL 1704911,
at *3 (D. Me. Jan. 8, 2001).
17 See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 285-88
(1989) (defining and discussing these non-use values (but adopting slightly different for-
mulations, including usage of the term "intertemporal value" in lieu of "bequest value"));
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 840
(1994) ("In particular, people may believe that a species or a pristine area has intrinsic
rather than instrumental value.").
18 See, e.g., Cross, supra note 17, at 289 (hypothesizing as to the loss of existence value
in the context of hazardous substance release).
19 See id. at 286-88 (making a similar analogy using the Grand Canyon and endangered
species).
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ues are real, yet non-use values are frequently underestimated or ig-
nored in determinations of how much polluters should pay for dam-
ages inflicted upon natural resources.20
When it passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),21 Congress sought to hold
polluters liable for the injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources
resulting from the release of hazardous substances into the environ-
ment.2 2 Congress and scholars further have recognized thatithe real
losses caused by pollution typically exceed lost use or market values, 23
and have expressed skepticism as to "the ability of human beings to
measure the true 'value' of a natural resource."24 This Article argues
that consideration of interim non-use values-those non-use values lost
in the period between the pollution and remediation or recovery of a
natural resource-is an effective method for CERCLA trustees to ad-
dress these concerns regarding proper valuation and to thereby ad-
vance the public interest.
Part I of the Article briefly describes the relationship between
CERCLA and various sections of the Department of the Interior regula-
tions. Part II argues that the regulations' treatment of non-use values is
subject to challenge for reasonableness under step two of the test de-
veloped in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, hic.25
Finally, Part III discusses the benefits of including non-use values in
natural resource damage assessments and offers some considerations
for trustees to use in determining the utility of calculating lost interim
non-use values in a given case.
20 See id. at 297 (stating that "there is no consensus over the legitimacy of considering
intrinsic, or even existence, value in measuring natural resource damages").
21 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(2000)). CERCLA, commonly known as the Superfund law, was amended by the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986).
22 CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (C) (2000).
23 The Ohio v. DOI court held that damages could not be limited to use value only.
Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court also noted
that natural resources are not "fungible," private markets may fail to reflect the value of
natural resources, and "use value" fails to capture the value of losses incurred as a result of
pollution. See id. at 456-57 & n.40. For a brief summary of Ohio v. DOI, see Charles B. An-
derson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of Restoration, 72 TUL. L. REv. 417, 441-45
(1997).
24 Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 457; see also id. at 457 n.40 (discussing the concerns of schol-
ars).
25 467. U.S. 837 (1984)..
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I. THE CURRENT DOI REGULATIONS
A. Overview
CERCLA requires the promulgation of damage determination
procedures to establish the amount of money to be sought in compen-
sation for injuries to natural resources. 26 These procedures are com-
monly referred to as natural resource damage assessments (NRDAs),
and regulations setting forth such procedures have been promulgated
by the Department of the Interior (DOI). Federal and state agencies
serve as trustees to oversee the NRDA process described in these regu-
lations. 27 However, due to an express regulatory provision declaring the
procedures "not mandatory," trustees are not bound to follow them
unless so required by agency guidance or state law.28 Some trustees use
the DOI regulations to take advantage of the "rebuttable presumption"
afforded by the statute, which shifts to potentially responsible parties
the burden of proof that the trustees' damage assessment is in error.
29
Other trustees conclude that the benefit of the presumption is out-
weighed by the difficulty of using the regulations30 or the resulting un-
dervaluation of the losses,31 and calculate damages under CERCLA us-
ing their own guidelines. 32
26 CERCLA § 301 (c) (1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c) (1)-(2) (2000).
27 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(rr) (2004) (defining "trustee" as "any Federal natural resources
management agency designated in the NCP and any State agency designated by the Gover-
nor of each state" pursuant to pertinent CERCLA provisions).
2- See 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (2004) ("The assessment procedures set forth in this part are
not mandatory."); United States v. Asarco Inc., No. CV 96-0122-N-EJL, 1998 WL 1799392,
at *2 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 1998) ("According to the applicable regulations, the assessment
procedures for determining natural resource damages are not mandatory.").
29 See CERCLA § 107(f)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. §9607(f)(2)(C) (2000); Ohio v. United
States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 439; Asarco, 1998 WL 1799392, at *2; Montauk Oil
Transp. Corp. v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass'n, 859 F. Supp. 669, 680 (S.D.N.Y 1994).
30 See Robert J. McManus, Why the Ohio Case Shouldn't Matter, 34 NAT. RESOURCESJ.
109, 109, 110 (1994) (stating that "the entire NRDA process is overly complicated, virtually
impossible to administer and of uncertain utility" and that the provisions "are so exquisi-
tively complex that their implementation is simply not worth the bother").
31 See, e.g., N.Y State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Natural Resource Damages: Enforcement
Guidance Memorandum (May 17, 1989) (noting the "low dollar value the regulations would assign
to natural resource damages"), at http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/ogc/egm/nrd.html.
32 For example, one state trustee describes its view as follows:
It appears, however, that the limited value of the 'rebuttable presumption'
is outweighed by many disadvantages inherent in the structure of the regula-
tions, especially the low dollar value the regulations would assign to natural
resource damages. More comprehensively, there are inherent limitations in
the assessment methodologies, both scientific and economic, and significant
procedural constraints in the regulations.
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DOI's current regulations,33 promulgated pursuant to section
301 (c) (2) (B) of CERCLA, were adopted following the Supreme Court's
decision in Ohio v. U.S. Department of the Interior, which held invalid a
regulation limiting recovery to the lesser of restoration cost or lost use
value of a resource.3 4 The current regulations set forth two types of pro-
cedures for performing NRDAs: the first involves the use of a standard
computer model to assess damages that result from chemical or oil dis-
charge in coastal environments (Type A assessment),3 5 and the second
provides "alternative protocols for conducting assessments in individual
cases" (Type B assessment).36 "The purpose of the [T]ype B assessment
is to provide alternative methodologies for conducting natural resource
damage assessments" in more complex, site-specific cases that require
an individualized approach.3 7
The DOI regulations prescribe the procedure for trustees to follow
at each stage of a case.38 Before initiating a CERCLA action, a trustee
conducts a "pre-assessment screen" to determine whether there is a rea-
sonable probability that a CERCLA claim would be successful.39 If ap-
propriate, the trustee then develops an "assessment plan" describing
how the trustee expects to determine the monetary value of the injury
caused by the pollution, 4° and indicates whether it intends to conduct a
Type A assessment or a Type B assessment.41 A Type B assessment will
commence if the standard Type A procedures are unavailable, or if the
In short, while the Department of Interior's regulations provide a useful
starting point and helpful guidance for conducting natural resource damage
assessments, strict adherence to them in order to gain the value of the 'rebut-
table presumption' is unwarranted.
Id.
33 The current regulations were promulgated in 1994. They are currently codified at
43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.93 (2004). Compare Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 56 Fed.
Reg. 19,752 (proposed April 29, 1991) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11), and Natural
Resource Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (Aug. 1, 1986) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 11), with Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (Mar. 25,
1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11).
- 880 F.2d 432, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Unsuccessful procedural and substantive chal-
lenges to the current DOI regulations were made in Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United
States Department of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
35 EPA, Natural Resource Damage Assessment, at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/pro-
grams/nrd/nrda2.htm (last updated Sep. 23, 2003).
36 CERCLA § 301 (c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c) (2) (2000).
37 43 C.F.R. § 11.60(a) (2004); see also EPA, supra note 35.
- See 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.93.
39 See id. §§ 11.23-.25.
- See id. §§ 11.30-.32.
41 See id. §§ 11.34-.36.
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trustee otherwise elects a Type B assessment over a Type A assess-
ment.42 After completing the assessment, the trustee prepares a report
describing the assessment and presents a demand to each potentially
responsible party for its share of the damages, 43 filing suit if appropri-
ate. If the trustee is successful in recovering funds, it develops a plan to
restore the injured natural resources. 44
B. Type B Assessments and Non-Use Values
Type B assessments generally consist of three steps: injury deter-
mination, injury quantification, and damage determination. 45 In the
damage determination phase, the trustee determines the amount of
money that will be sought as compensation for injury to natural re-
sources.46 For the Type B damage determination phase, the regula-
tions state that
[t] he measure of damages is the cost of restoration, rehabili-
tation, replacement, and/or acquisition of the equivalent of
the injured natural resources and the services those re-
sources provide. Damages may also include, at the discretion
of the authorized official, the compensable value of all or a
portion of the services lost to the public for the time period
from the discharge or release until the attainment of the res-
toration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of
equivalent of the resources and their services to baseline. 47
While the above language seems to focus exclusively on lost use val-
ues, the regulations define "compensable value" as follows:
Compensable value is the amount of money required to
compensate the public for the loss in services provided by
the injured resources between the time of the discharge or
release and the time the resources and the services those re-
sources provided are fully returned to their baseline condi-
tions. The compensable value includes the value of lost pub-
42 Officials decide between pursuing Type A and Type B procedures pursuant to the
guidelines in 43 C.F.R. § 11.35. See also id. § 11.36 (describing situations in which both
Type A and Type B procedures may be used).
43 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.90-.91 (2004).
- See id. §§ 11.91-.93.
45 Id. § 11.60(b).
46 See id. § 11.80(b).
47 Id. (emphasis added).
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lic use of the services provided by the injured resources, plus
lost nonuse values such as existence and bequest values. Com-
pensable value is measured by changes in consumer surplus,
economic rent, and any fees or other payments collect-
able .... 48
Thus, the definition of "compensable value", and hence the measure of
damages, appears to include both use value and non-use value. 49 Cru-
cially, however, the regulations then proceed to require that "[e]stim-
ation of option and existence values shall be used only if the authorized
official determines that no use values can be determined."50
II. As-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO THE REGULATIONS
A. Challenges to Assessments Relying on the Regulatory Language
The inclusion of "nonuse values such as existence and bequest val-
ues" in the definition of compensable value, coupled with a require-
ment that "option and existence values" can be used only if no use val-
ues can be determined, places trustees using the regulations in an
awkward predicament with respect to including non-use values in dam-
age assessments. 51 It will be an exceptionally rare case in which a natu-
ral resource has no use value whatsoever-nearly everything has some
market value. The importance of non-use value is that it recognizes
non-market based values, which coexist with market values. 52 Thus, the
regulations appear to preclude trustees from considering option and
existence values in almost every case, leaving only bequest value as a
non-use value for proper consideration. 53 A reasonable rationale for
this disparate treatment of different types of non-use values is elusive.
Based on this simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of certain
non-use values, the DOI regulations may be susceptible to as-applied
48 Id. § 11.83(c) (1) (emphases added).
49 Use value is defined as "the value of the resources to the public attributable to the
direct use of the services provided by the natural resources." 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1)(i).
Non-use value is defined as "the difference between compensable value and use value, as
those terms are used in this section." Id. § 11.83(c) (1) (ii).
50 Id. § 11.83(c) (1) (iii) (emphases added).
51 See id.
52 See Cross, supra note, 17 at 285-97 (describing different formulations of non-market
based non-use values).
53 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c) (2004) (listing acceptable values and valuation methods
used in cost estimation of injured or lost natural resources).
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legal challenges. 5 4 Section 301 (c) (2) of CERCLA provides that the
"regulations ... shall take into consideration factors including, but
not limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosys-
tem or resource to recover."5 5 This language certainly permits the in-
clusion of other factors; indeed it can be argued that section
301 (c) (2)'s "not limited to" language actually requires that the DOI
regulations include at least one other factor for consideration in mak-
ing NRDAs under the regulations. 5 6 As seen above, DOI has included
lost non-use values in the regulations as an additional factor for con-
sideration in conducting damage assessments. 57
A federal administrative agency's regulations may be challenged
under the standard announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.5 8 Step one of the Chevron inquiry applies
where the statutory meaning is unambiguous. 59 If a regulation violates
the plain language of a statute, it will be invalidated under Chevron step
54 See id.
55 CERCLA § 301 (c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c) (2) (2000).
56 See id.; 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.80-84 (2004). While "including, but not limited to" language
is most commonly understood as permissive and not mandatory, it certainly can take on a
mandatory meaning. Take, for example, the following hypothetical requirement from a
university policy on the serving of alcoholic beverages: "Foods served shall not be limited
to salty foods which increase thirst." In this context, "shall not be limited to" is clearly a
clause indicating mandatory behavior. Thus, the "including, but not limited to" language
in section 301(c) (2) could be a combination of two statutory requirements: (a) include
these enumerated factors and (b) include other factors designed to advance the legislative
goals of the statute. This construction may make particular sense in light of congressional
statements of concern for proper valuation of lost natural resources. Whether or not one
agrees with this analysis of the language of section 301 (c) (2), that section clearly permits
the inclusion of additional factors in the regulations; as such, the inclusion of non-use
values in the regulations-and subsequent NRDAs-is subject to challenge under Chevron
step two, as described below. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
57 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1). If section 301(c) (2) is read to require inclusion of an
additional factor, the necessary additional factor cannot be restoration value, which al-
ready must be considered. See CERCLA § 107(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0 (1) ("There shall
be no double recovery under this chapter for natural resource damages, including the
costs of damage assessment or restoration, rehabilitation, or acquisition for the same re-
lease and natural resource."). Under Ohio v. DOI, sections 301 and 107 of CERCLA should
be read in conjunction when determining what Congress mandated be taken into consid-
eration when measuring damages. See Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 446-
47 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that one cannot read section 107 while ignoring the existence
of section 301). Under this construction, "restoration value" is added to the factors for
consideration enumerated in section 301 (c) (2). See id.
58 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
59 Id. (framing the question as "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue").
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one.60 If the statutory meaning is ambiguous, then the regulation is
evaluated for reasonableness under step two of the Chevron inquiry.61
Congress's "but not limited to" language does not unambiguously
state which additional factor may (or must) be included in the regula-
tion, nor to what extent that additional factor should be considered or
used in assessing natural resource damages. 62 Here, DOI has chosen one
additional factor to be considered-non-use values-which on its face
seems sufficient to satisfy the statutory language of section 301 (c) (2).63
But how should these non-use values be considered, if at all?
In practice, these regulations are subject to an as-applied reason-
ableness challenge under Chevron step two, based on the perplexing
treatment of non-use values that permits option and existence values
to be included in damages only when no use values can be deter-
mined.64 Although the regulations allow for consideration of "nonuse
values such as existence and bequest values,"65 the end result is that
trustees following the regulations will virtually never consider option
60 See id.
61 Id. at 843.
62 See CERCLA § 301 (c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c) (2). Not only does section 301 (c) (2)
not indicate what the additional factor might be, the provision does not indicate whether
an additional factor must be actually be included in the damage assessment. In other words,
can the regulation allow a trustee to consider assessing the additional factor-here, non-
use values-and then allow the trustee to decline to include it in the damage measure, or
does the statute require that the regulation mandate consideration and inclusion of an
additional factor in NRDAs performed using the regulations? On the one hand, the fact
that section 107 of CERCLA provides that damages "shall not be limited by" the amounts
that can be used to restore or replace the resources could mean only that trustees can
charge more than the amounts necessary to restore or replace the resources, but it does
not require them to do so. CERCLA and the Ohio v. DOI decision embrace the idea of
maximizing the discretion of the trustee, and there may be a concern that trustees should
not recover sums unsubstantiated by evidence. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.80(b) (2004) ("Damages
may also include, at the discretion of the authorized official, the compensable value .... );
see also CERCLA § 107(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1) (2000); Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 447-
48. On the other hand, Congress, in passing CERCLA, evidenced a concern that humans
cannot properly evaluate the true worth of natural resources, and would have wanted all
factors, even if the value is minimal, to be included in the damage assessment. See Cross,
supra note 17, at 284.
63 The regulations would probably survive a facial challenge under Chevron step one
because compensable value includes "nonuse values such as existence and bequest values."
43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c) (1). It is only in practice that non-use values will not be considered
(both in improperly defining compensable value and by failing to address any non-use
values once use values are determined). See id. § 11.83(c) (1) (iii).
6 See id. § 11.83(c) (1) (iii). A finding or conclusion by a trustee based on this provision
might also be considered arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act,
especially if significant non-use values are ignored. SeeAPA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
r543 C.FR. § 11.83(c) (1).
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and existence values because some minimal use values will always be
easily identifiable, and because no other additional factors are indi-
cated in the regulations. 66 It seems an unreasonable construction of
the statute to adopt regulations that welcome entrance of non-use
values through the front door, in the definition of compensable value,
only to immediately drive them out the back, by allowing estimation
of non-use values only when use values are completely absent.
67
B. Challenges to Assessments Using Incomplete Regulatory Language
A separate obstacle to a full recovery for natural resource dam-
ages is that some trustees do not even reach the point of deciding
whether to consider non-use values, because they fail to recognize the
complete definition of compensable value. 68 For example, some trus-
tee assessment plans used by federal administrative agencies and state
environmental agencies that ostensibly follow the regulations do not
indicate that non-use values will be considered in the damage deter-
mination phase.69 Rather, these plans define "compensable value" for
6 See Cross, supra note 17, at 284.
67 The counterargument to this conclusion is equally unreasonable: one could concep-
tualize "option" and "existence" values as different from "bequest" value because option
and existence values are things Ienjoy, while bequest value is something I hope others will
enjoy. Making this distinction, trustees could consider bequest value under 43 C.F.R.
§ 11.83(c)(1)(iii), even if use values are determined. Thus, bequest -value would be the
additional factor under CERCLA section 301 (c) (2). However, some scholars consider exis-
tence value to be comprised of the subparts option value and bequest value and it is
difficult to provide a rationale for why trustees would be allowed to estimate bequest value,
but not existence or option values. See Cross, supra note 17, at 285-86.
68 This would not withstand judicial review because the definition of compensable
value would be "plainly erroneous" and "inconsistent" with the regulation's plain lan-
guage. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) ("But the ulti-
mate criterion is the administrative interpretation which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."); Albemarle Corp. v.
Herman, 221 F.3d 782, 785 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[Als is the case here, the Secretary's interpre-
tation is not entitled to deference if it is unreasonable or contrary to the regulation's plain
language.") (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
156-57 (1991)).
'9 See, e.g., MICH. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY ET AL., STAGE I ASSESSMENT PLAN: KALA-
MAZOO RIVER ENVIRONMENT SITE § 6.1 (Nov. 2000) ("Compensable values for interim
losses are 'the value of lost public use of services provided by the injured resources.'"),
available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/nrda/kalamazoo/report.pdf; U.S. FISH & WILD-
LIFE SERV., LOWER Fox RIVER/GREEN BAY NRDA INITIAL RESTORATION AND COMPENSA-
TION DETERMINATION PLAN § 2.1 (Sep. 14, 1998) (prepared by Hagler Bailly Servs.)
("Compensable values include 'the value of lost public use of the services provided by the
injured resources.'"), available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/nrda/rcdp.pdf; see also U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & STATE OF IND., ASSESSMENT PLAN FOR THE NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE GRAND CALUMET RIVER, INDIANA HARBOR SHIP CANAL, IN-
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interim losses as "the value of lost public use of the services provided
by the injured resources," deleting the remaining portion of the regu-
latory definition, "plus lost nonuse values such as existence and be-
quest values."70
While the DOI regulations make consideration and assessment of
non-use values difficult, non-use values should not be dismissed out of
hand at any stage of the NRDA process without a fair look at the po-
tential benefits of including them in an assessment.
C. Proposals
Trustees that follow the DOI regulations should take notice of in-
terim non-use values to the extent permitted by the regulations. 71 DOI,
for its part, should amend the regulations to allow trustees to include
lost non-use values in their calculations of damages under CERCLA
DIANA HARBOR, AND ASSOCIATED LAKE MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTS 46-49 (Oct. 1997)
(prepared by Indus. Econ., Inc.) (finding only three areas where compensable value may
be calculated: interim losses of habitats that provided "important services" to humans;
interim losses of recreational opportunities; and interim losses representing increased
costs of past or committed future public development projects), available at http://
www.fws.gov/midwest/GrandCalumetRiver/gcraplan.pdf. Contra U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., LOWER Fox RIVER/GREEN BAY NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PLAN
§ 9.3.1 (Aug. 1996) (stating that "[clompensable values include 'the value of lost public
use of the services provided by the injured resources, plus lost nonuse values such as exis-
tence and bequest values'"), available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/nrda/assess.pdf.
This plan proceeds to embrace the consideration of non-use values at length, first by quot-
ing DOI regulation language and then further by adding its own formulation:
Nonuse values (or passive use values) arise from the values individuals place
on resources apart from their own readily identified and measured direct use.
Nonuse values may include bequest values for the availability of resources for
use by others now and in the future, and existence values for the protection
of the resources even if they are never used [56 F.R. 19760].
Additionally, option values to preserve the site for one's own potential fu-
ture use and casual or indirect uses of natural resources, such as enjoying the
site while driving or walking by or working near the site; and enjoying hearing
about, reading about, or seeing photographs of the site may also be included
in direct uses or passive uses depending on the study design.
Id.
7 0 See43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1) (2004).
71 See Miriam Montesinos, It May Be Silly, But It's an Answer: The Need to Accept Contingent
Valuation Methodology in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 48, 78 (1999)
("Federal courts, DOI and experts have agreed that nonuse values must be included and
have provided for nonuse values to be part of NRD assessments."). However, state natural
resource damage laws may expressly prohibit the use and recovery of non-use values. See,
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.20104(2)-(3) (2003).
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regardless of whether any lost use values can be determined, 72 particu-
larly in light of the otherwise very conservative calculation procedures
set forth in the regulations, which often result in severe underestima-
tions of the cost of remediation. 73
III. THE UTILrrY OF NON-USE VALUES
As explained in the introduction, non-use value includes existence,
option, and bequest value. 74 Existence value is the worth to people of
knowing that a given natural resource is protected; option value is the
value to people of retaining the option for future use; and bequest
value comes from knowing that a natural resource will be available to
future generations. 75 The literature on these non-use values abounds
with discussion of the difficulty of calculating non-use values. But many
of these articles lose sight of an administrative reality: CERCLA trustees,
whose role it is to assess resource damages and pursue claims for recov-
ery, have the autonomy to decide how, or even whether, to charge pol-
luters for lost non-use values.
A. Measuring Non-Use Values
Because non-use values are inherently non-economic, perhaps the
most common method of calculating such values involves asking indi-
viduals what dollar figure they would assign to a particular resource.
76
This type of study is termed a contingent valuation (CV) study. The Ohio
v. DOI court upheld DOI's continued use of CV as a "best available pro-
cedure" in determining resource values under CERCLA.77 The CV pro-
cess "set[s] up hypothetical markets to elicit ... [the] economic valua-
tion of a natural resource," and is used when there are no adequate
models of market behavior available to measure use or non-use values.
78
72 Such amendment should not be problematic; the regulation must be reviewed and re-
vised as appropriate every two years. CERCLA § 301 (c) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c) (3) (2000).
7s SeeN.Y State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 31.
74 Cross, supra note 17, at 285-86.
75 Id. at 285-86.
76 See id. at 315, 320 n.267 (citing Alan Randall, Total Economic Value as a Basis for Policy,
116 TRANSACTIONS AM. FiSHERIES Soc'y 325, 329 (1987) (declaring that contingent valua-
tion "offers the only means of directly estimating the total value of nonmarketed environ-
mental assets")).
77 Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 423, 478 (1989). However, reliance on
CV studies may expose a NRDA to further as-applied challenges under Chevron step two.
78 See id. at 475. Adequate models of market behavior that could be useful in measur-
ing non-use values are contributions to charitable organizations, calculations of donated
time, and the like, which indicate the economic resources some humans are willing to
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Specifically, "CV involves a series of interviews with individuals for the
purpose of ascertaining the values they respectively attach to particular
changes in particular resources." 79 While some have expressed criticism
that CV studies can result in overestimation of damages and speculative
or egregious outcomes,8° the Ohio v. DOIcourt made clear its unwilling-
ness to judicially overrule "DOI's careful estimate of the caliber and
worth of CV methodology."81
Contingent valuation studies do have several important substantive
weaknesses, which have been discussed in detail by numerous scholars.
Highly susceptible to bias, overestimation of how much money people
would spend to preserve a resource, question sequence effects, "pair"
effects, and insensitivity to quantity, CV can result in implausibly high
valuations. 82 There are procedural difficulties as well. For example, the
applicable facts may change during preparation of a CV study, forcing
the trustee to choose between proceeding with the development of an
expend on non-economic benefits. This market-based analysis may provide more predict-
able results than a CV study, but will probably also result in dramatic undervaluation of
non-use value due to the transaction costs and injection of other issues into the valuation
question. However, because of their conservative nature, market indicators of non-use
value may provide trustees with strong, and cheaply obtained, data on non-use value for
inclusion in NRDAs.
79 Id. For a short critique of CV techniques, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 76-83 (1995) (discussing whether CV
or other alternatives are adequate surrogates for willingness to pay).
80 See Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 475-76; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Coherent and Incoherent
Valuation: A Problem with Contingent Valuation of Cultural Amenities 1 (Feb. 2002) (prelimi-
nary draft Sep. 25, 2001) (arguing that the problem with contingent valuation is category-
bound thinking: "[w]hen people explore particular problems in isolation, they normalize
them by comparing them to a cognitively accessible comparison set, consisting of cases
from the same basic category"), at http://culturalpolicy.uchicago.edu/workingpapers/
Sunsteinl 2.pdf.
81 880 F.2d at 478.
8 SeeJames Peck, Comment, Measuring Justice for Nature: Issues in Evaluating and Litigat-
ing Natural Resources Damages, 14J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 284 (1999) ("Critics of the
method argue that the method is hypothetical and generates unreliable damage estimates,
produces results that cannot be independently validated, determines value from persons
lacking sufficient information to be estimating value, and is not consistent with principles
of valuation that are basic to the economics profession.") (citations omitted); Note, "Ask a
Silly Question... " Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1981,
1984-89 (1992) (discussing the unreliability of contingent valuation for non-use values).
See generally Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number
Better than No Number?, 8J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1994); Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Deter-
minants of Stated Willingness to Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Model 9J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994).
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outdated study, or beginning the study once the facts are fully devel-
oped but risking critical delay in obtaining the results.83
Because it is so difficult to calculate non-use values, it should not be
surprising that many trustees are reluctant to incorporate lost non-use
values into natural resource damage assessments.84 Another factor that
may discourage trustees from considering non-use values is that natural
resources historically have been defined in terms of use. Nevertheless, a
strictly use-based approach does not sufficiently capture nature's full
value. 85 'The fundamental problem of damage valuation for the per se
loss of wildlife is that the intrinsic worth of natural resources does not
conveniently fit the terms of economic accountability. "86 Including non-
use values in NRDAs strikes a balance between the purely economic view
of the value of natural resources and more controversial notions such as
assessing damages for animal suffering caused by pollution.
8 7
83 See Dale B. Thompson, Valuing the Environment: Courts' Struggles with Natural Resource
Damages, 32 ENvTL. L. 57, 85 (2002).
Therefore, trustees could face an unappealing choice, either proceed with
the development of an original CVM study and face the possibility that new
information will make the expensive study irrelevant, or choose to wait until
the facts are more fully developed. However, requirements for speedy trials
combined with the lengthy process of developing an original CVM study ...
could mean that the results would not be available in time for trial.
Id.
8 See id.
5 Many view their freedom from environmental risk and the protection of pristine ar-
eas not as a function of use, "but for their beauty or their independence from human
artifice," and "[tlhe emphasis in law on 'use value' inadequately captures the way they
value the relevant goods." Sunstein, supra note 17, at 839. "In environmental law, the major
issue of contestation is frequently the appropriate kind of valuation of environmental
amenities; if beaches, species, and mountains were valued solely for their use, we would
not be able to understand them in the way that we now do." Id. at 860; see also Gregory G.
Garre, Environmental Law: CERCLA, Natural Resource Damage Assessments, and the D.C. Cir-
cuit's Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations under Chevron, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932,
940 (1990) ("The diminution in use value standard for calculating natural resource dam-
ages is criticized on the ground that 'it ignores the reality that natural resources may have
worth beyond their use by humans' and thus undervalues natural resource damages." (ci-
tations omitted)).
86 ZYGMUNTJ.B.. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 189 (3d ed. 2004); see also Cross, supra note 17, at 270 ("Placing an economic
value on natural resources is not just an academic exercise.").
87 But perhaps expanding the notion of non-use Value is appropriate. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 394 (2003) (stating that balancing
human versus animal interests must depend on vdues-"on how much weight we should
assign to the relevant interests," and suggesting at the very least that "suffering and harms to
animals should count"); J. Baird Callicott, Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental
Ethics, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 299, 300 (1984) (stating that nature must have some value even when
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B. The Benefits ofAssessing Damages for Lost Non-Use Values
Assessing damages for lost non-use values can bestow many
benefits upon communities affected by pollution. The additional
funds procured can be used as a "reserve" fund in the (very likely)
event that the actual cost of restoration or replacement exceeds the
amount calculated and received from the perpetrator for remedia-
tion.88 Moreover, assessing additional liability for injury to special re-
sources will require potential polluters to exercise extra caution with
assets that are important to the public, and will help protect such re-
sources. Finally, the assessment of damages for lost non-use values
recognizes the loss of a resource that may be central to the identity of
a community and the insult caused by a polluter who failed to exer-
cise due care for the communities it affected.89
The consideration of non-use values is optional for many trus-
tees.90 Those trustees that are not bound by the odd strictures of the
DOI regulations should seriously consider calculating lost non-use
values in each case they handle. Although the costs of calculating
damages may sometimes outweigh the benefits of collecting such
damages, in cases where calculation of the lost non-use values is war-
ranted, the imposition of liability for such losses can have several dif-
ferent levels of utility.9 1 Situations in which it is especially worthwhile
humans fail to recognize it). "Does wildlife, for example, have no value beyond that to
humans, or is wildlife worthwhile-even sacred--on its own terms?" Cross, supra note 17,
at 290. An obligation to pay such damages is not unforeseeable considering that the goals
of CERCLA are deterrence and complete restoration. One criticism could be that, at some
point, it is wasteful to make people pay for restoration or for the interests of other living
things when use is much lower. But DOI would be free to develop a limitation to prevent
"grossly disproportionate" assessments of non-use values as compared to use values. See V.
Scott Bailey, Note, Changes in Natural Resources Damage Assessment Procedures: The Department
of Interior's Response to Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior, 1 ENVTL. LAw. 315,
319 (1994) ("The court gave DOI latitude to create exceptions to the restoration cost
preference if restoration is infeasible or if restoration costs are grossly disproportionate to
use value."); see also 132 CONG. REc. 29,767 (1986) ("Where, of course, restoration is tech-
nically impossible or the costs thereof are grossly disproportionate to the value of the re-
sources to society as a whole, then other valuation measures, both market and nonmarket,
must be used.").
88 See Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("It
would be odd indeed for a Congress so insistent that all damages be spent on restoration
to allow a 'lesser' measure of damages than the cost of restoration ..... ).
. See generally Bisulca, supra note 2 (noting the cultural, physical, and spiritual rela-
tionship of Penobscot Nation to the Penobscot River and the disrespect shown to them in
the polluting of the river).
- See 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (2004); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
91 See Note, supra note 82, at 1993 ("CV should be used only if the costs of excluding
nonuse values outweigh the costs generated by CV itself.").
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to consider non-use values include those where: the likelihood of liti-
gation remains low; 9 2 some market indicator of non-use value is avail-
able;93 a previously completed contingent valuation study related to a
similar resource already exists; 94 or the resource is unique, well-
known, or has suffered long-term or irreversible damage.
95
Trustees should err in favor of calculating non-use values because,
as Congress recognized when it passed CERCLA, humans-through
ignorance or indifference---often fail to acknowledge much of nature's
intrinsic value.96 These damages, in addition to paying for restoration
and creating other benefits discussed below, would help advance CER-
CLA's primary goals of deterrence and environmental protection. 97
92 Trustees must assess the increased probability that adding non-use values may sub-
vert the out-of-court process, thereby imposing "obstacles to the achievement of an impor-
tant goal of CERCLA-the preference that recovery of natural resource damages be
achieved through settlement rather than by a court." Thompson, supra note 83, at 85-86.
"Settlement discussions may [also] be hindered by uncertainty about the amount of non-
use value damages trustees will seek." Id. at 86. That said, few CERCLA cases go to trial. See
OFFICE OF ENVTL. GUIDANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, INTEGRATING NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACITIES AT DOE FACILITIES
11 (Oct. 1993) ("The rebuttable presumption is, however, primarily of importance in the
event of litigation. Few natural resource damages cases have, in fact, actually been tried,
with most being settled out of court." (endnote omitted)), available at http://www.eh.doe.
gov/oepa/guidance/CERCLA/nrda3.pdf.
9s See Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 475; see also supra text accompanying note 78.
9 Such parallel studies may be needed if the trustees lack the funds necessary to de-
velop their own CV studies.
95 Note, supra note 82, at 1995 & n.95; see alsoJohn V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsid-
ered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778-80 (1967). See generally A. Myrick Freeman I, Nonuse
Values in Natural Resource Damage Assessment, in VALUING NATURAL ASSETS: THE ECONOMICS
OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 264, 299-300 (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry
Smith eds., 1993).
96 Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 457.
97 Restoration might include any non-use or intrinsic values, and CERCLA may envi-
sion a broader construction of restoration in natural resource damage assessments. After
all, a primary goal of CERCLA was to make whole the natural resources that suffer injury.
As a result, restoration, and its costs, may be justified even when restoration costs outrun
willingness to pay. This suggestion is not so outrageous if one remembers that CERCLA is a
statute designed to deter future release of hazardous pollutants into the environment. If
restoration costs must be paid, even if extremely high, this can further the goals of deter-
rence and environmental protection. After all, restoration is the proper basic valuation
measure. See id. at 446. In support of using restoration as the sole remedy for publicly-
owned natural resources, see, for example, Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration as the Economi-
cally Efficient Remedy for Damage to Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 430
(1991) (advocating restoration as the only efficient remedy that will compensate the public
fully for its loss). See also Frank B. Cross, Restoring Restoration for Natural Resource Damages,
24 U. TOL. L. REV. 319, 321 (1993) (arguing that restoration provides optimal preservation
as a low cost "selective process that uses the power of natural forces to recreate a better
functioning ecosystem").
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Assessment of damages for non-use values is unlikely to lead to "exces-
sive precautions" on the part of economic players and potential pollut-
ers.98 CERCLA liability is so disastrous for polluters that firms and indi-
viduals already engage in economically inefficient behaviors in order to
avoid such liability. An additional calculation in conducting NRDAs is
unlikely to cause a marked increase in economically inefficient behav-
iors. To the contrary, inclusion of non-use values in NRDAs will facili-
tate economically efficient activity in the restoration and rep acement
of lost natural resources because the necessary restoration fumds will be
available.99
CONCLUSION
No argument can be made that it is easy to calculate non-use values.
But many trustees have wide discretion in deciding both whether to fol-
low the DOI regulations and whether to consider non-use values in dam-
age determinations. As the vignette of the Penobscot River illustrates, the
injury caused by pollution is multifaceted. Where warranted, there are
multiple benefits to charging polluters for damages beyond the simple
repair of the physical problem they caused. The inclusion of non-use val-
ues would help promote accountability and deterrence, and ensure that
the human interests negatively affected by pollution are adequately ad-
dressed.
98 But see Note, supra note 82, at 1990-91 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 176 (3d ed. 1986)).
99 See Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 445 (stating that DOI's regulations were not in line with
Congress's intention for recovery to be sufficient to cover the costs of restoration).
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